Is the kalam/cosmological class of arguments a viable/tenable logical means to establish a transcendent entity responsible for the existence of reality?

Augustine was among the first to whom is attributed a recorded (written) argument in this class.

WL Craig's contemporary formulation of this argument:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
   2.1. Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite:
        2.1.1. An actual infinite cannot exist.
        2.1.2. An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
        2.1.3. Therefore an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
   2.2. Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive addition:
        2.2.1. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
        2.2.2. The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
        2.2.3. Therefore the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.
3. Therefore the universe has a cause of its existence.

And some select objections..

First the alternate "argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite" (2.1. above):
2.1.1. An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.1.2. An actual infinite God cannot exist.
2.1.3. Therefore, God began to exist, or God does not exist.

Now a quick round-up of some objections in bullet form:
• the cosmological argument is an invalid a-posteriori inductive argument because experience does not justify extrapolating/transcending from experience to beyond
• first cause assumes without warrant that causal relations are linear, successive and enumerable (also see the "positive feedback" phenomenon, continuity vs discreteness, the "butterfly effect")
• first cause assumes without warrant that the universe itself, in it's entirety, is an effect (composition fallacy)
• first or unmoved mover assumes without warrant that some rest-state is fundamental, and that movement is not irreducibly basic, requiring an ignition or catalyst (also see laws of conservation)
• it is meaningless to speak of time itself as a cause of an effect (time is prior causation; causality presupposes time)
• even if we accept simultaneous causation in this context, such a situation would collapse causation temporally, which cannot be maintained (contrary to all experience/observation)
• insisting on contingency of our reality, and shifting non-contingency to something else, something unknown, might be charged with double standards (arbitrary)
• seeking to explain "creation of the everything" with a single uncaused cause (transcendent), merely defers one mystery to another, and thus lacks sought explanation anyway

One common theme among these arguments is (e.g. JP Moreland, and 2.2. above):
• the present cannot be reached from minus infinity
Well, yes it can, if given an infinite amount of time (more accurately, that same "infinity", to avoid equivocation).
Otherwise the argument can be charged with petitio principii, since it already presumed a finite past.
But, note, minus infinity is not a vantage point — there was no time that properly can be called "minus infinity" (misconception leading to confirmation bias).

An "infinite regress" is not a fallacy, nor a logical impossibility.
If there was no time when our universe became an effect of a cause, then we effectively have an uncaused universe.
Besides, such an "extra-universal" cause suffers the exact same counter-arguments as anything else proposed as being self-caused or un-caused; it requires strictly bare assertions to shift self/un-caused from the universe to God, which does not carry much merit in a philosophical context.

Ok, let us assume for a minute that something is responsible for the emergence of our universe (which is presumed to have emerged).
Having created even time itself (a dubious sentence), such an act of creation would be constant and ongoing (always was, always will be), suggesting that we should be able to detect it at this very moment.
Entertaining such an a-temporal cause would lead us to expect an infinite past; without a sufficient reason for a finite past, this argument can thus be charged with petitio principii.
If some benign law of nature is discovered that can account for such an emergence (e.g. by rigorous scientific investigation), then this law of nature is God (according to the kalam/cosmological class of arguments).

Thus, reasonably, the answer to the original question is: no.